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Abstract
In two-player games on graphs, the players move a token through a graph to produce an infinite path,
which determines the winner or payoff of the game. Such games are central in formal verification since
they model the interaction between a non-terminating system and its environment. We study bidding
games in which the players bid for the right to move the token. Bidding games with variants of first-
price auctions were previously studied: in each round, the players simultaneously submit bids, the higher
bidder moves the token, and, in Richman bidding, pays his bid to the other player whereas in poorman
bidding, pays his bid to the “bank”. While reachability poorman games have been studied before, we
present, for the first time, results on infinite-duration poorman games. A central quantity in these games
is the ratio between the two players’ initial budgets. We show that the favorable properties of reachability
poorman games extend to complex qualitative objectives such as parity, similarly to the Richman case:
each vertex has a threshold value, which is a necessary and sufficient ratio with which a player can
achieve a goal. Our most interesting results concern quantitative poorman games, namely mean-payoff
poorman games, where we construct optimal strategies depending on the initial ratio. The crux of the
proof shows that strongly-connected mean-payoff poorman games are equivalent to biased random-turn
games. The equivalence in itself is interesting, because it does not hold for reachability poorman games
and it is richer than the equivalence with uniform random-turn games that Richman bidding exhibit. We
also solve the complexity problems that arise in poorman games.
1 Introduction
Two-player infinite-duration games on graphs are a central class of games in formal verification [4] and have
deep connections to foundations of logic [43]. They are used to model the interaction between a system and
its environment, and the problem of synthesizing a correct system then reduces to finding a winning strategy
in a graph game [41]. Theoretically, they have been widely studied. For example, the problem of deciding
the winner in a parity game is a rare problem that is in NP and coNP [27], not known to be in P, and for
which a quasi-polynomial algorithm was only recently discovered [15].
A graph game proceeds by placing a token on a vertex in the graph, which the players move throughout
the graph to produce an infinite path (“play”) pi. The game is zero-sum and pi determines the winner or pay-
off. Two ways to classify graph games are according to the type of objectives of the players, and according
to the mode of moving the token. For example, in reachability games, the objective of Player 1 is to reach a
designated vertex t, and the objective of Player 2 is to avoid t. An infinite play pi is winning for Player 1 iff
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it visits t. The simplest mode of moving is turn based: the vertices are partitioned between the two players
and whenever the token reaches a vertex that is controlled by a player, he decides how to move the token.
We study a new mode of moving in infinite-duration games, which is called bidding, and in which the
players bid for the right to move the token. The bidding mode of moving was introduced in [31, 32] for
reachability games, where two variants of first-price auctions where studied: Each player has a budget, and
before each move, the players submit sealed bids simultaneously, where a bid is legal if it does not exceed
the available budget, and the higher bidder moves the token. The bidding rules differ in where the higher
bidder pays his bid. In Richman bidding (named after David Richman), the higher bidder pays the lower
bidder. In poorman bidding, which is the bidding rule that we focus on in this paper, the higher bidder
pays the “bank”. Thus, the bid is deducted from his budget and the money is lost. Note that while the sum
of budgets is constant in Richman bidding, in poorman bidding, the sum of budgets shrinks as the game
proceeds. One needs to devise a mechanism that resolves ties in biddings, and our results are not affected
by the tie-breaking mechanism that is used.
Bidding games naturally model decision-making settings in which agents need to invest resources in an
ongoing manner. We argue that the modelling capabilities of poorman bidding exceed those of Richman
bidding. Richman bidding is restricted to model “scrip” systems that use internal currency to avoid free
riding and guarantee fairness. Poorman bidding, on the other hand, model a wider variety of settings since
the bidders pay their bid to the auctioneer. We illustrate a specific application of infinite-duration poorman
bidding in reasoning about ongoing stateful auctions, which we elaborate on in Section 4.6.
Example 1. Consider a setting in which two buyers compete in auction to buy k ∈ IN goods that are “rented”
for a specific time duration. For example, a webpage has k ad slots, and each slot is sold for a fixed time
duration, e.g., one day. At time point 1 ≤ i ≤ k, good i is put up for sale in a second-price auction, where
the higher bidder pays the auctioneer and keeps the good for the fixed duration of time. We focus on the
first buyer. Each good entails a reward for him, and we are interested in devising a bidding strategy that
maximize the long-run average of the rewards. For example, the simple case of a site with one ad slot is
represented by the game that is depicted in Fig. 1, where the vertex v1 represents the case that Player 1’s ad
appears and v2 represents the case that Player 2’s ad appears. Player 1’s goal is to maximize the long-run
average time that his ad appears, which intuitively amounts to “staying” as much time as possible in v1.
Player 1’s goal is formally described as a mean-payoff objective, which we elaborate on below. Our results
on mean-payoff poorman games allow us to construct an optimal strategy for the players.
Another advantage of poorman bidding over the Richman bidding is that their definition generalizes
easily to domains in which the restriction of a fixed sum of budgets is an obstacle. For example, in ongoing
auctions as described in the example above, often a good is sold to multiple buyers with partial information
of the budgets. These are two orthogonal concepts that have not been studied in bidding games and are both
easier to define in poorman bidding rather than in Richman bidding.
A central quantity in bidding games is the ratio of the players’ initial budgets. Formally, let Bi ∈ IR≥0,
for i ∈ {1, 2}, be Player i’s initial budget. The total initial budget is B = B1 + B2 and Player i’s initial
ratio is Bi/B. The first question that arises in the context of bidding games is a necessary and sufficient
initial ratio for a player to guarantee winning. For reachability games, it was shown in [31, 32] that such
threshold ratios exist in every reachability Richman and poorman game: for every vertex v there is a ratio
Th(v) ∈ [0, 1] such that (1) if Player 1’s initial ratio exceeds Th(v), he can guarantee winning, and (2) if
his initial ratio is less than Th(v), Player 2 can guarantee winning. This is a central property of the game,
which is a form of determinacy, and shows that no ties can occur.1
An intriguing equivalence was observed in [31, 32] between random-turn games [39] and reachability
bidding games, but only with Richman-bidding. For r ∈ [0, 1], the random-turn game that corresponds to a
1When the initial budget of Player 1 is exactly Th(v), the winner of the game depends on how we resolve draws in biddings.
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bidding game G w.r.t. r, denoted RTr(G), is a special case of stochastic game [23]: rather than bidding for
moving, in each round, independently, Player 1 is chosen to move with probability r and Player 2 moves
with the remaining probability of 1 − r. Richman reachability games are equivalent to uniform random-
turn games, i.e., with r = 0.5 (see Theorem 7 for a precise statement of the equivalence). For reachability
poorman-bidding games, no such equivalence is known and it is unlikely to exist since there are (simple)
finite poorman games with irrational threshold ratios. The lack of such an equivalence makes poorman
games technically more complicated.
More interesting, from the synthesis and logic perspective, are infinite winning conditions, but they
have only been studied in the Richman setting previously [6]. We show, for the first time, existence of
threshold ratios in qualitative poorman games with infinite winning conditions such as parity. We show
a linear reduction from poorman parity games to poorman reachability games, similarly to the proof in
the Richman setting. First, we show that in a strongly-connected game, one of the players wins with any
positive initial ratio, thus the bottom strongly-connected components (BSCCs, for short) of the game graph
can be partitioned into “winning” for Player 1 and “losing” for Player 1. Second, we construct a reachability
poorman game in which each player tries to force the game to a BSCC that is winning for him.
Things get more interesting in mean-payoff poorman games, which are zero-sum quantitative games; an
infinite play of the game is associated with a payoff which is Player 1’s reward and Player 2’s cost, thus
we respectively refer to the players in a mean-payoff game as Max and Min. The central question in these
games is: Given a value c ∈ Q, what is the initial ratio that is necessary and sufficient for Max to guarantee
a payoff of c? More formally, we say that c is the value with respect to a ratio r ∈ [0, 1] if for every  > 0,
we have (1) when Max’s initial ratio is r+ , he can guarantee a payoff of at least c, and (2) intuitively, Max
cannot hope for more: if Max’s initial ratio is r − , then Min can guarantee a payoff of at most c.
Our most technically-involved contribution is a construction of optimal strategies in mean-payoff poor-
man games, which depend on the initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. The key component of the solution is a quantitative
solution to strongly-connected games, which, similar to parity games, allows us to reduce general mean-
payoff poorman games to reachability poorman games by reasoning about the BSCCs of the graph. Before
describing our solution, let us highlight an interesting difference between Richman and poorman bidding.
With Richman bidding, it is shown in [6] that a strongly-connected mean-payoff Richman-bidding game has
a value that does not depend on the initial ratio and only on the structure of the game. It thus seems reason-
able to guess that the initial ratio would not matter with poorman bidding as well. We show, however, that
this is not the case; the higher Max’s initial ratio is, the higher the payoff he can guarantee. We demonstrate
this phenomenon with the following simple game. Technically, each vertex in the graph has a weight the
payoff of an infinite play pi is defined as follows. The energy of a prefix pin of length n of pi, denoted E(pin),
is the sum of the weights it traverses. The payoff of pi is lim infn→∞E(pin)/n.
Example 2. Consider the mean-payoff poorman game that is depicted in Figure 1. We take the viewpoint
of Min in this example. We consider the case of r = 12 , and claim that the value with respect to r =
1
2 is 0.
Suppose for convenience that Min wins ties. Note that the players’ choices upon winning a bid in the game
are obvious, and the difficulty in devising a strategy is finding the right bids. Intuitively, Min copies Max’s
bidding strategy. Suppose, for example, that Min starts with a budget of 1 +  and Max starts with 1, for
some  > 0. A strategy for Min that ensures a payoff of 0 is based on a queue of numbers as follows: In
round i, if the queue is empty Min bids  ·2−i, and otherwise the maximal number in the queue. If Min wins,
he removes the minimal number from the queue (if non-empty). If Max wins, Min adds Max’s winning bid
to the queue. For example, suppose Max’s first bid is 0.2, he wins since Min bids /2, and Min adds 0.2 to
the empty queue. Min’s second bid is 0.2. Suppose Max bids 0.3 in the second turn, thus he wins again. Min
adds 0.3 to the queue and bids 0.3 in the third bidding. Suppose Max bids 0.1, thus Min wins and removes
0.3 from the queue. In the next bidding his bid is 0.2.
We make several observations. (1) Min’s strategy is legal: it never bids higher than the available budget.
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Figure 1: A mean-payoff game.
1 −1 −1 −2
v1 v2 v3 v4
Figure 2: A second mean-payoff game.
(2) The size of the queue is an upper bound on the energy; indeed, every bid in the queue corresponds to a
Max winning bid that is not “matched” (the size is an upper bound since Min might win biddings when the
queue is empty). (3) If Min’s queue fills, it will eventually empty. Indeed, if b ∈ IR is in the queue, in order
to keep b in the queue, Max must bid at least b, thus eventually his budget runs out. Combining, since the
energy is at most 0 when the queue empties, Min’s strategy guarantees that the energy is at most 0 infinitely
often. Since we use lim inf in the definition of the payoff, Min guarantees a non-positive payoff. Showing
that Max can guarantee a non-negative payoff with an initial ratio of 12 +  is harder, and a proof for the
general case can be found in Section 4.
We show that the value c decreases with Max’s initial ratio r. We set r = 13 . Suppose, for example,
that Min’s initial budget is 2 +  and Max’s initial budget is 1. We claim that Min can guarantee a payoff
of −1/3. His strategy is similar to the one above, only that whenever Max wins with b, Min pushes b to the
queue twice. Observations (1-3) still hold. The difference is that now, since every Max win is matched by
two Min wins, when the queue empties, the number of Min wins is at least twice as much as Max’s wins,
and the claim follows.
This example shows the contrast between Richman and poorman bidding. When using Richman bidding,
Min can guarantee a payoff of 0 with every initial budget, and cannot guarantee −, even with a ratio of
1− δ, for any , δ > 0.
In order to solve strongly-connected mean-payoff poorman games, we identify the following equivalence
with biased random-turn games. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff poorman game G and a ratio
r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that RTr(G) is the random-turn game in which Max is chosen with probability r and
Min with probability 1 − r. Since G is a mean-payoff game, the game RTr(G) is a stochastic mean-payoff
game. Its value, denoted MP(RTr(G)), is the optimal expected payoff that the players can guarantee, and is
known to exist [35]. For every  > 0, we show that when Max’s initial ratio is r + , he can guarantee a
payoff of MP(RTr(G)), and he cannot do better: Min can guarantee a payoff of at most MP(RTr(G)) with
an initial ratio of 1 − r + . Thus, the value of G w.r.t. r equals MP(RTr(G)). One way to see this result
is as a form of derandomization: we show that Max has a deterministic bidding strategy in G that ensures a
behavior that is similar to the random behavior of RTr(G). We find this equivalence between the two models
particularly surprising due to the fact that, unlike Richman bidding, an equivalence between random-turn
games and reachability poorman games is unlikely to exist. Second, while Richman games are equivalent
to uniform random-turn games, we are not aware of any known equivalences between bidding games and
biased random-turn games, i.e., r 6= 0.5.
Recall that a strongly-connected mean-payoff Richman-bidding game G has a value c that does not
depend on the initial ratio. The value comes from an equivalence with uniform random-turn games [6]: the
value c of G under Richman bidding equals the value of the uniform stochastic mean-payoff game RT0.5(G).
That is, with Richman bidding, Min can guarantee c with an initial ratio of δ, and cannot guarantee c − 
with an initial ratio of 1− δ, for every , δ > 0. One interesting corollary is that the value of G when viewed
as a Richman game equals the value of G when viewed as a poorman game with respect to the initial ratio
0.5. We are not aware of previous such connections between the two bidding rules.
Finally, we address, for the first time, complexity issues in poorman games; namely, we study the prob-
lem of finding threshold ratios in poorman games. We show that for qualitative games, the corresponding
decision problem is in PSPACE using the existential theory of the reals [16]. For mean-payoff games, the
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problem of finding the value of the game with respect to a given ratio is also in PSPACE for general games,
and for strongly-connected games, we show the value can be found in NP and coNP, and even in P for
strongly-connected games with out-degree 2.
Related work As mentioned above, bidding games can model ongoing auctions, like the ones that are
used in internet companies such as Google to sell advertisement slots [37]. Sequential auctions, which are
also ongoing, have been well studied, e.g., [33, 45], and let us specifically point [26, 44], which, similar to
bidding games, studies two-player sequential auctions with perfect information. Bidding games differ from
these models in two important aspects: (1) bidding games are zero-sum games, and (2) the budgets that are
used for bidding do not contribute to the utility and are only used to determine which player moves. Point
(2) implies that bidding games are particularly appropriate to model settings in which the budget has little
or no value, similar in spirit to the well-studied Colonel Blotto games [13]. A dynamic version of Colonel
Blotto games called all-pay bidding games has been recently studied [10]. Non-zero-sum Richman-bidding
games have been used to reason about ongoing negotiations [34].
Graph games are popular to reason about systems in formal methods [22] and about multi-agent systems
in AI [3]. Bidding games extend the modelling capabilities of these games and allow reasoning about multi-
process systems in which a scheduler accepts payment in return for priority. Blockchain technology is one
example of such a technology. Simplifying the technology, a blockchain is a log of transactions issued by
clients and maintained by miners. In order to write to the log, clients send their transactions and an offer
for a transaction fee to a miner, who has freedom to decide transaction priority. We expect that a more
precise modelling of such systems will assist in their verification against attacks, which is a problem of
special interest since bugs can result in significant losses of money (see for example, [18] and a description
of an attack http://bit.ly/2obzyE7). Note that poorman bidding models such settings better than
Richman bidding since transaction fees are paid to the scheduler (the miners) rather than the other player.
Richman bidding is appropriate when modelling “scrip systems” that use internal currency to prevent free-
riding [28], and are popular in databases for example.
In this work, we show that mean-payoff poorman games are equivalent to biased random-turn games.
Thus, there is a contrast with mean-payoff Richman games, which are equivalent to uniform random-turn
games. To better understand these differences between the seemingly similar bidding rules, mean-payoff
taxman games where studied in [9]. Taxman bidding were defined and studied in [31] for reachability
objectives span the spectrum between Richman and poorman bidding. They are parameterized by a constant
τ ∈ [0, 1]: portion τ of the winning bid is paid to the other player, and portion 1 − τ to the bank. Thus,
with τ = 1 we obtain Richman bidding and with τ = 0, we obtain poorman bidding. It was shown
that the value of a mean-payoff taxman bidding game G parameterized by τ and with initial ratio r equals
MP(RTF (τ,r)(G)), for F (τ, r) = r+τ ·(1−r)1+τ .
To the best of our knowledge, since their introduction, poorman games have not been studied. Motivated
by recreational games, e.g., bidding chess [12, 30], discrete bidding games with Richman bidding rules
are studied in [24], where the money is divided into chips, so a bid cannot be arbitrarily small unlike the
bidding games we study. Infinite-duration discrete bidding games with Richman bidding and various tie-
breaking mechanisms have been studied in [1], where they were shown to be a largely determined sub-class
of concurrent games.
2 Preliminaries
A graph game is played on a directed graphG = 〈V,E〉, where V is a finite set of vertices andE ⊆ V ×V is
a set of edges. The neighbors of a vertex v ∈ V , denoted N(v), is the set of vertices {u ∈ V : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E},
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and we say that G has out-degree 2 if for every v ∈ V , we have |N(v)| = 2. A path in G is a finite or
infinite sequence of vertices v1, v2, . . . such that for every i ≥ 1, we have 〈vi, vi+1〉 ∈ E.
Objectives An objective O is a set of infinite paths. In reachability games, Player 1 has a target vertex
vR and an infinite path is winning for him if it visits vR. In parity games each vertex has a parity index in
{1, . . . , d}, and an infinite path is winning for Player 1 iff the maximal parity index that is visited infinitely
often is odd. We also consider games that are played on a weighted graph 〈V,E,w〉, where w : V → Q.
Consider an infinite path pi = v1, v2, . . .. For n ∈ IN, we use pin to denote the prefix of length n of pi.
We call the sum of weights that pin traverses the energy of the game, denoted E(pin). Thus, E(pin) =∑
1≤j<nw(vj). In energy games, the goal of Player 1 is to keep the energy level positive, thus he wins
an infinite path iff for every n ∈ IN, we have E(pin) > 0. Unlike the previous objectives, a path in a
mean-payoff game is associated with a payoff, which is Player 1’s reward and Player 2’s cost. Accordingly,
in mean-payoff games, we refer to Player 1 as Min and Player 2 as Max. We define the payoff of pi to
be lim infn→∞ 1nE(pi
n). We say that Max wins an infinite path of a mean-payoff game if the payoff is
non-negative.
Strategies and plays A strategy prescribes to a player which action to take in a game, given a finite history
of the game, where we define these two notions below. For example, in turn-based games, a strategy takes as
input, the sequence of vertices that were visited so far, and it outputs the next vertex to move to. In bidding
games, histories and strategies are more complicated as they maintain the information about the bids and
winners of the bids. Formally, a history is a sequence τ = v0, 〈v1, b1, `1〉, 〈v2, b2, `2〉, . . . , 〈vk, bk, `k〉 ∈
V · (V × IR× {1, 2})∗, where, for j ≥ 1, in the j-th round, the token is placed on vertex vj−1, the winning
bid is bj , and the winner is Player `j , and Player `j moves the token to vertex vj . A strategy prescribes
an action 〈b, v〉, where b is a bid that does not exceed the available budget and v is a vertex to move to
upon winning. The winner of the bidding is the player who bids higher, where we assume there is some
mechanism to resolve draws, and our results are not affected by what the mechanism is. More formally,
for i ∈ {1, 2}, let Bi be the initial budgets of Player i, and, for a finite history pi, let Wi(pi) be the sum
of Player i winning bids throughout pi. In Richman bidding, the winner of a bidding pays the loser, thus
Player 1’s budget following pi is B1 −W1 + W2. In poorman bidding, the winner pays the “bank”, thus
Player 1’s budget following pi is B1−W1. Note that in poorman bidding, the loser’s budget does not change
following a bidding. An initial vertex together with two strategies for the players determine a unique infinite
play pi for the game. The vertices that pi visits form an infinite path path(pi). Player 1 wins pi according to
an objective O iff path(pi) ∈ O. We call a strategy f winning for Player 1 if for every strategy g of Player 2
the play they determine satisfies O. Winning strategies for Player 2 are defined dually.
Definition 3. (Initial ratio) Suppose the initial budget of Player i is Bi, for i ∈ {1, 2}, then the total initial
budget is B = B1 +B2 and Player i’s initial ratio is Bi/B. We assume B > 0.
The first question that arrises in the context of bidding games asks what is the necessary and sufficient
initial ratio to guarantee an objective. We generalize the definition in [31, 32]:
Definition 4. (Threshold ratios) Consider a poorman or Richman game G, a vertex v, and an initial ratio r
and objective O for Player 1. The threshold ratio in v, denoted Th(v), is a ratio in [0, 1] such that
• if r > Th(v), then Player 1 has a winning strategy that guarantees O is satisfied, and
• if r < Th(v), then Player 2 has a winning strategy that violates O.
Recall that we say that Max wins a mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 if the mean-payoff value is non-
negative. Finding Th(v) for a vertex v in G thus answers the question of what is the minimal ratio of the
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initial budget that guarantees winning. A more refined question asks what is the optimal payoff Max can
guarantee with an initial ratio r. Formally, for a constant c ∈ Q, let Gc be the mean-payoff game that is
obtained from G by decreasing all weights by c.
Definition 5. (Mean-payoff values) Consider a mean-payoff game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1].
The value of G with respect to c, denoted MPr(G, v), is such that Th(v) = r in Gc.
Random-turn games In a stochastic game the vertices of the graph are partitioned between two players
and a nature player. As in turn-based games, whenever the game reaches a vertex of Player i, for i = 1, 2,
he choses how the game proceeds, and whenever the game reaches a vertex v that is controlled by nature,
the next vertex is chosen according to a probability distribution that depends only on v.
Consider a game G = 〈V,E〉. The random-turn game with ratio r ∈ [0, 1] that is associated with G is
a stochastic game that intuitively simulates the fact that Player 1 chooses the next move with probability r
and Player 2 chooses with probability 1 − r. Formally, we define RTr(G) = 〈V1, V2, VN , E,Pr, w〉, where
each vertex in V is split into three vertices, each controlled by a different player, thus for α ∈ {1, 2, N},
we have Vα = {vα : v ∈ V }, nature vertices simulate the fact that Player 1 chooses the next move with
probability r, thus Pr[vN , v1] = r = 1 − Pr[vN , v2], and reaching a vertex that is controlled by one of the
two players means that he chooses the next move, thus E = {〈vα, uN 〉 : 〈v, u〉 ∈ E and α ∈ {1, 2}}. When
G is weighted, then the weights of v1, v2, and vN equal that of v.
Fixing two strategies f and g for the two players in a stochastic game results in a Markov chain, which
in turn gives rise to a probability distribution D(f, g) over infinite sequences of vertices. A strategy f is
optimal w.r.t. an objectiveO if it maximizes supf infg Prpi∼D(f,g)[pi ∈ O]. For the objectives we consider, it
is well-known that optimal strategies exist, which are, in fact, positional; namely, strategies that only depend
on the current position of the game and not on its history.
Definition 6. (Values) Let r ∈ [0, 1]. For a qualitative game G, the value of RTr(G), denoted val(RTr(G)),
is the probability that Player 1 wins when he plays optimally. For a mean-payoff game G, the mean-payoff
value of RTr(G), denoted MP(RTr(G)), is the maximal expected payoff Max obtains when he plays opti-
mally.
3 Qualitative Poorman Games
For qualitative objectives, poorman games have mostly similar properties to the corresponding Richman
games, though they are technically more complicated than Richman bidding. We start with reachability
objectives, which were studied in [32, 31]. The objective they study is slightly different than ours and we
call it double-reachability: both players have targets and the game ends once one of the targets is reached.
As we show below, for our purposes, the variants are equivalent since there are no draws in finite-state
double-reachability poorman and Richman games.
Consider a double-reachability game G = 〈V,E, u1, u2〉, where, for i = 1, 2, the target of Player i is
ui. In both Richman and poorman bidding, trivially Player 1 wins in u1 with any initial budget and Player 2
wins in u2 with any initial budget, thus Th(u1) = 0 and Th(u2) = 1. For v ∈ V , let v+, v− ∈ N(v) be
such that, for every v′ ∈ N(v), we have Th(v−) ≤ Th(v′) ≤ Th(v+).
Theorem 7. [32, 31] Threshold ratios exist in reachability Richman and poorman games. Moreover, con-
sider a double-reachability game G = 〈V,E, u1, u2〉.
• In Richman bidding, for v ∈ V \ {u1, u2}, we have Th(v) = 12
(
Th(v+) + Th(v−)
)
, and it follows
that Th(v) = val(RT0.5(G, v)) and that Th(v) is a rational number.
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• In poorman bidding, for v ∈ V \{u1, u2}, we have Th(v) = Th(v+)/
(
1−Th(v−)+Th(v+)). There
is a game G and a vertex v with an irrational Th(v).
Proof. The proof here is similar to [31] and is included for completeness, with a slight difference: unlike
[31], which assume that every vertex has a path to both targets, we also address the case where one of the
targets is not reachable. This will prove helpful when reasoning about infinite-duration bidding games. The
Richman case is irrelevant for us and we leave it out.
We start with the two simpler claims. Assume that in a double-reachability poorman game G, for each
vertex v, we have Th(v) = Th(v+)/
(
1 − Th(v−) + Th(v+)). We show a double-reachability poorman
game with irrational threshold ratios. Consider the game with vertices u1, v1, v2, and u2, and edges u1 ←
v1 ↔ v2 → u2. Solving the equation above we get Th(v1) = (
√
5−1)/2 and Th(v2) = (3−
√
5)/2, which
are irrational.
Next, we show existence of threshold ratios in a reachability poorman games by reducing them to double-
reachability games. Consider a game G = 〈V,E, u1〉. Let S ⊆ V be the set of vertices that have no path
to u1. Since Player 1 cannot win from any vertex in S, we have Th(v) = 1. Let G′ = 〈V ′, E′, u1, u2〉 be
the double-reachability game that is obtained from G by setting V ′ = V \ S and Player 2’s target u2 to be a
vertex in S. Consider a vertex v ∈ V ′. We claim that Th(v) in G′ equals Th(v) in G. Indeed, if Player 1’s
ratio exceeds Th(v) he can draw the game to u1, and if Player 2’s ratio exceeds 1− Th(v) he can draw the
game to S.
Finally, we show that every vertex in a double-reachability game has a threshold ratio. Consider a
double-reachability poorman game G = 〈V,E, u1, u2〉. It is shown in [31] that there exists a unique function
f : V → [0, 1] that satisfies the following conditions: we have f(u1) = 0 and f(u2) = 1, and for every
v ∈ V , we have f(v) = f(v+)
1+f(v+)−f(v−) , where v
+, v− ∈ N(v) are the neighbors of v that respectively
maximize and minimize f , i.e., for every v′ ∈ N(v), we have f(v−) ≤ f(v′) ≤ f(v+).
We claim that for every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = f(v). Our argument will be for Player 1 and duality
gives an argument for Player 2. Suppose Player 1’s budget is f(v) +  and Player 2’s budget is 1− f(v), for
some  > 0. Note that we implicitly assume that f(v) < 1. In case f(v) = 1 we do not show anything, but
still, our dual strategy for Player 2 ensures that u2 is visited, when the initial budget for Player 2 is positive.
We describe a Player 1 strategy that forces the game to u1.
Similar to [31], we divide Player 1’s budget ratio into his real budget and a slush fund. We will ensure
the following invariants:
1. Whenever we are in state v, if x is Player 1’s real budget and y is Player 2’s budget, then f(v) =
x/(x+ y).
2. Every time Player 2 wins a bidding the slush fund increases by a constant factor. Formally, there exists
a constant c > 1, such that when 0 is the initial slush fund and i is the slush fund after Player 2 wins
for the i-th time, we have that i > c · i−1, for all i ≥ 1.
Note that these invariants are satisfied initially.
We describe a Player 1 strategy. Consider a round in vertex v in which Player 1’s real budget is x′,
Player 2’s budget is y′ and the last time Player 2 won (or initially, in case Player 2 has not won yet) his slush
fund was ′. Player 1’s bid is ∆(v) ·x′+δv · ′, where we define ∆(v) and δv below. Upon winning, Player 1
moves to v−, i.e., to the neighbor that minimizes f(v), or, when f(v) = 0, he moves to a vertex closer to
u1. Upon winning, Player 1 pays ∆(v) · x′ from his real budget and δv · ′ from his slush fund.
For v ∈ V \ {u1, u2}, if f(v) > 0 and f(v−) < 1, let ∆(v) = f(v)−f(v
−)
f(v)(1−f(v−)) and otherwise, let
∆(v) = 0. Note that the second invariant indicates that Player 2 cannot win more than a finite number of
times, since whenever he wins, the slush fund increases by a constant and the slush fund cannot exceed 1,
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because then it would be bigger than the total budget. This in turn shows that eventually Player 1 wins n
times in a row, which ensures that the play reaches u1.
We choose δv, for v ∈ V , and show that our choice implies that Player 1’s strategy maintains the
invariant above. Let ∆min be the smallest positive number such that f(v) = ∆min for some v, and ∆min = 1
if f(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V . Let δ1 be 1 and δi be such that
∑i−1
j=1 δj < ∆min/2δi, for all i ∈ {2, . . . , |V |}.
Also, let γ be such that
∑|V |
j=1 δj < 1/γ. For each state v (such that f(v) > 0), consider that Player 1 wins
all bids and let dist(v) be the number of bids before the play ends up in u1 starting from v. When f(v) = 0,
let dist(v) be the length of the shortest path from v to u1. Then, δv = γδi, for i = |V | − dist(v).
In case Player 1 wins, his real budget becomes x′−∆(v)x′, and Player 2’s budget stays y′. In that case,
Player 1’s new real budget ratio becomes (1−∆(v))x
′
(1−∆(v))x′+y′ = f(v
−), and the invariants are thus satisfied. (His
slush fund also decreases by δv′. We will not proof anything about the slush fund in this case, except noting
that it stays positive).
In case Player 2 wins, Player 1’s real budget stays x′ and Player 2’s budget is at most y′−∆(v)x′−δv′.
By construction, we have that if Player 2’s budget became y′−∆(v)x′, then Player 1’s budget ratio becomes
x′
x′+y′−∆(v)x′ = f(v
+), so even if Player 2 moves to v+, Player 2 has paid δv′ too much for Player 1’s real
budget ratio to be f(v+). Thus, the first invariant is satisfied. Note that this also indicates that f(v+) 6= 1,
in this case, since otherwise Player 1’s budget ratio must be above 1, indicating that Player 2’s budget is
negative. When f(v+) > 0, we can move δv′f(v+)/(1 − f(v+)) ≥ δv′∆min into the slush fund. When
f(v+) = 0, the new slush fund is δv′. Let j be such that δj = δv. By construction of δv, we have that since
the last time Player 2 won a bidding (or since the start if Player 2 never won a bid before), we have subtracted
at most ′
∑|V |
i=j+1 δi from the slush fond and now we have added δj
′∆min. But δi was chosen such that∑|V |
i=j+1 δi was below δv∆min/2. Hence, we have added δv
′∆min to the previous content of ′. Because δv
and ∆min are constants, we have thus increased the slush fund by a constant factor. The invariants are thus
satisfied in this case.
We continue to study poorman games with richer objectives.
Theorem 8. Parity poorman games are linearly reducible to reachability poorman games. Specifically,
threshold ratios exist in parity poorman games.
Proof. The crux of the proof is to show that in a bottom strongly-connected component (BSCC, for short)
of G, one of the players wins with every initial budget. Thus, the threshold ratios for vertices in BSCCs are
either 0 or 1. For the rest of the vertices, we construct a reachability game in which a player’s goal is to
reach a BSCC that is “winning” for him.
Formally, consider a strongly-connected parity poorman game G = 〈V,E, p〉. We claim that there is
α ∈ {0, 1} such that for every v ∈ V , we have Th(v) = α, i.e., when α = 0, Player 1 wins with any
positive initial budget, and similarly for α = 1. Moreover, deciding which is the case is easy: let vMax ∈ V
be the vertex with maximal parity index, then α = 0 iff p(vMax) is odd.
Suppose p(vMax) is odd and the proof for an even p(vMax) is dual. We prove in two steps. First,
following the proof of Theorem 7, we have that when Player 1’s initial budget is  > 0, he can draw the
game to vMax once. Second, we show that Player 1 can reach vMax infinitely often when his initial budget
is  > 0. Player 1 splits his budget into parts 1, 2, . . ., where i =  · 2−i, for i ≥ 1, thus
∑
i≥1 i = .
Then, for i ≥ 0, following the i-th visit to vMax, he plays the strategy necessary to draw the game to vMax
with initial budget i+1.
We turn to show the reduction from parity poorman games to double-reachability poorman games. Con-
sider a parity poorman game G = 〈V,E, p〉. Let S ⊆ V be a BSCC in G. We call S winning for Player 1 if
the vertex vMax with highest parity index in S has odd p(vMax). Dually, we call S winning for Player 2 if
p(vMax) is even. Indeed, the claim above implies that for every S that is winning for Player 1 and v ∈ S,
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we have Th(v) = 0, and dually for Player 2. Let G′ be a double-reachability poorman game that is obtained
from G by setting the BSCCs that are winning for Player 1 in G to be his target in G′ and the BSCCs that are
winning for Player 2 in G to be his target in G′. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7, we have that Th(v) in G
equals Th(v) in G′, and we are done.
4 Mean-Payoff Poorman Games
This section consists of our most technically challenging contribution. We construct optimal strategies for
the players in mean-payoff poorman games. The crux of the solution regards strongly-connected mean-
payoff games, which we develop in the first three sub-sections.
Consider a strongly-connected game G and an initial ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. We claim that the value in G w.r.t. r
does not depend on the initial vertex. For a vertex v in G, recall that MPr(G, v) is the maximal payoff Max
can guarantee when his initial ratio in v is r + , for every  > 0. We claim that for every vertex u 6= v in
G, we have MPr(G, u) = MPr(G, v). Indeed, as in Theorem 8, Max can play as if his initial ratio is /2 and
draw the game from u to v, and from there play using an initial ratio of r + /2. Since the energy that is
accumulated until reaching v is constant, it does not affect the payoff of the infinite play starting from v.
We write MPr(G) to denote the value of G w.r.t. r. We show the equivalence with random-turn games:
the value MPr(G) equals the value MP(RTr(G)) of the random-turn mean-payoff game RTr(G) in which Max
chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1− r.
4.1 Warm up: solving a simple game
In this section we solve a simple game through which we demonstrate the ideas of the general case. Recall
that in an energy game, Min wins a finite play if the sum of weights it traverses, a.k.a. the energy, is 0 and
Max wins an infinite play in which the energy stays positive throughout the play.
Lemma 9. [31] In the energy game that is depicted in Fig. 1, if the initial energy is k ∈ IN, then Max wins
iff his initial ratio exceeds k+22k+2 .
The first implication in Lemma 9 is the important one for us. It shows that Max can guarantee a payoff
of 0 with an initial budget that exceeds 0.5. Indeed, given an initial ratio of 0.5 + , Max plays as if the
initial energy is k ∈ IN such that k+22k+2 < 0.5 + . He thus keeps the energy bounded from below by −k,
which implies that the payoff is non-negative.
We describe an alternative proof for the first implication in Lemma 9 whose ideas we will later general-
ize. We need several definitions. For k ∈ IN, let Sk be the square of area k2. In Fig. 3, we depict S5. We
split Sk into unit-area boxes such that each of its sides contains k boxes. A diagonal in Sk splits it into a
smaller black triangle and a larger white one. For k ∈ IN, we respectively denote by tk and Tk the areas of
the smaller black triangle and the larger white triangle of Sk. For example, we have t5 = 10 and T5 = 15,
and in general tk =
k(k−1)
2 and Tk =
k(k+1)
2 .
2 3 4 5 6
tk 1 3 6 10 15
Tk 3 6 10 15 21
. . .
Figure 3: The square S5 with area 25 and the sizes of some triangles.
Suppose the game starts with energy κ ∈ IN. We show that Max wins when his ratio exceeds κ+22κ+2 ,
which equals Tκ+1
(κ+1)2
. For ease of presentation, it is convenient to assume that the players’ ratios add up to
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1 + 0, Max’s initial ratio is
Tκ+1
(κ+1)2
+ 0, and Min’s initial ratio is
tκ+1
(κ+1)2
. For j ≥ 0, we think of j as Max’s
slush fund in the j-th round of the game, though its role here is somewhat less significant than in Theorem 7.
Consider a play pi. We think of changes in energy throughout pi and changes in budget ratio as representing
two walks on two sequences. The energy sequence is IN and the budget sequence is {tk/Sk : k ∈ IN}, with
the natural order in the two sets. We show a strategy for Max that maintains the invariant that whenever the
energy is k ∈ IN, then Max’s ratio is greater than Tk+1/(k + 1)2. That is, whenever Max wins a bidding,
both sequences take a “step up” and when he loses, both sequences take a “step down”.
We describe Max’s strategy. Upon winning a bidding, Max proceeds to v1, thus the energy increases
by one. We assume WLog. that upon winning, Min proceeds to v2, thus the energy decreases by one. The
challenge is to find the right bids. Suppose the energy level is k at the j-th round. Thus, Max and Min’s ratio
are respectively Tk+1/(k+1)2 +j and tk+1/(k+1)2. In other words, Min owns tk+1 boxes and Max owns
a bit more than Tk+1 boxes. Max’s bid consists of two parts. Max bids 1/(k+ 1)2 + j/2, or in other words,
a single box and half of his slush fund. We first show how the strategy maintains the invariant and then how
it guarantees that an energy of 0 is never reached. Suppose first that Max wins the bidding. The total number
of boxes decreases by one to (k + 1)2 − 1, his slush fund is cut by half, and Min’s budget is unchanged.
Thus, Max’s ratio of the budget is more than (Tk+1 − 1)/
(
(k+ 1)2 − 1), which equals Tk+2/(k+ 2)2. For
example, let k = 4 and Max’s ratio exceeds T5t5+T5 . Following a bidding win the energy increases to k = 5
and Max’s ratio is more than T5−1t5+T5−1 =
15−1
25−1 =
21
36 =
T6
t6+T6
. In other words, we take a step up in both
sequences. The other case is when Min wins the bidding, the energy decreases by 1, and we show that the
budget sequences takes a step down. Since Max bids more than one box, and Min overbids, Min bids at
least one box. Max’s new ratio is more than Tk+1/((k + 1)2 − 1) = Tk/k2, thus dually, both sequences
take a step down. For example, again let k = 4 and Max’s ratio exceeds T5t5+T5 . Upon losing a bidding, the
energy decreases to k = 3 and Max’s ratio is 1525−1 =
10
16 =
T4
t4+T4
.
It is left to show that the energy never reaches 0, thus the walk on the budget sequence never reaches the
first element. Suppose the energy is k = 1 in the j-th round, thus according to the invariant, Max’s ratio is
3
4 + j and Min’s ratio is
1
4 . Recall that Max bids
1
(k+1)2
+ j/2 at energy k. In particular, he bids 14 + j/2
at energy 1, which exceeds Min’s budget, thus Max necessarily wins the bidding, implying that the energy
increases.
4.2 The potential and strength of vertices
In an arbitrary strongly-connected game the bids in the different vertices cannot be the same. In this section
we develop a technique to determine the “importance” of a node v, which we call its strength and measures
how high the bid should be in v compared with the other vertices.
Consider a strongly-connected game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and r ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that RTr(G) is a random-turn
game in which Max chooses the next move with probability r and Min with probability 1− r. A positional
strategy is a strategy that always chooses the same action (edge) in a vertex. It is well known that there exist
optimal positional strategies for both players in stochastic mean-payoff games.
Consider two optimal positional strategies f and g in RTr(G), for Min and Max, respectively. For a
vertex v ∈ V , let v−, v+ ∈ V be such that v− = f(vMin) and v+ = g(vMax). The potential of v,
denoted Potr(v), is a known concept in probabilistic models and its existence is guaranteed [42]. We use
the potential to define the strength of v, denoted Str(v), which intuitively measures how much the potentials
of the neighbors of v differ. We assume w.l.o.g. that MP(RTr(G)) = 0 as otherwise we can decrease all
weights by this value. Let ν ∈ Q be such that r = νν+1 . The potential and strengths of v are functions that
satisfy the following:
Potr(v) =
ν · Potr(v+) + Potr(v−)
1 + ν
+ w(v) and Str(v) =
Potr(v+)− Potr(v−)
1 + ν
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There are optimal strategies for which Potr(v−) ≤ Potr(v′) ≤ Potr(v+), for every v′ ∈ N(v), which can
be found for example using the strategy iteration algorithm.
Consider a finite path pi = v1, . . . , vn in G. We intuitively think of pi as a play, where for every 1 ≤ i < n,
the bid of Max in vi is Str(vi) and he moves to v+i upon winning. Thus, if vi+1 = v
+
i , we say that Max
won in vi, and if vi+1 6= v+i , we say that Max lost in vi. Let W (pi) and L(pi) respectively be the indices
in which Max wins and loses in pi. We call Max wins investments and Max loses gains, where intuitively
he invests in increasing the energy and gains a higher ratio of the budget whenever the energy decreases.
Let G(pi) and I(pi) be the sum of gains and investments in pi, respectively, thus G(pi) =
∑
i∈L(pi) St
r(vi)
and I(pi) =
∑
i∈W (pi) St
r(vi). Recall that the energy of pi is E(pi) =
∑
1≤i<nw(vi). The following lemma
connects the strength, potential, and energy.
Lemma 10. Consider a strongly-connected game G, a ratio r = ν1+ν ∈ (0, 1) such that MP(RTr(G)) = 0,
and a finite path pi in G from v to u. Then, Potr(v)− Potr(u) ≤ E(pi) + ν ·G(pi)− I(pi).
Proof. We prove by induction on the length of pi. For n = 1, the claim is trivial since both sides of the
equation are 0. Suppose the claim is true for paths of length n and we prove for paths of length n + 1. Let
pi′ be the prefix of pi starting from the second vertex. We distinguish between two cases. In the first case,
Max wins in v, thus pi′ starts from v+. Note that since Max wins the first bidding, we have G(pi) = G(pi′)
and I(pi) = Str(v) + I(pi′). Also, we have E(pi) = E(pi′) + w(v). Combining these with the induction
hypothesis, we have
E(pi)+ν·G(pi)−I(pi) = −Str(v)+w(v)+E(pi′)+ν·G(pi′)−I(pi′) ≥ −Str(v)+w(v)+Potr(v+)−Potr(u) =
=
Potr(v−)− Potr(v+) + (1 + ν) · Potr(v+)
1 + ν
+ w(v)− Potr(u) = Potr(v)− Potr(u)
In the second case, Max loses the first bidding, thus pi′ starts from some v′ with Potr(v′) ≥ Potr(v−),
I(pi) = I(pi′), and G(pi) = G(pi′) + Str(v). We combine with the induction hypothesis to obtain the
following
E(pi)+ν ·G(pi)−I(pi) = ν ·Str(v)+w(v)+E(pi′)+ν ·G(pi′)−I(pi′) ≥ Str(v)+w(v)+Potr(v′)−Potr(u) ≥
≥ Str(v)+w(v)+Potr(v−)−Potr(u) = ν · Pot
r(v+)− ν · Potr(v−) + (1 + ν) · Potr(v−)
1 + ν
+w(v)−Potr(u) =
= Potr(v)− Potr(u)
Example 11. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 2. Max always proceeds left and Min always proceeds
right, so, for example, we have v+2 = v1 and v
−
2 = v3. It is not hard to verify that MP(RT
2/3(G)) = 0
by finding the stationary distribution of RT2/3(G). We have P 23 (v1) = 6, P 23 (v2) = 3, P 23 (v3) = 0,
and P
2
3 (v4) = −3. Thus, the strengths are St 23 (v1) = 1, St 23 (v2) = 2, St 23 (v3) = 2, and St 23 (v4) = 1.
Consider the path pi = v0, v1, v2, v2, v1, v0 in which Max wins the first three bids and loses the last two, thus
G(pi) = 1+2 and I(pi) = 2+2+1 = 5. We haveE(pi) = −1 since the last vertex does not contribute to the
energy. The left-hand side of the expression in Lemma 10 is 0, and the right-hand side is−1 + 2 ·3−5 = 0.
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4.3 Defining a richer budget sequence
In this section we generalize the ideas from Section 4.1 so that we can treat any strongly-connected graph
and any initial ratio. Let r = ν1+ν . For the remainder of this section we fix Min’s budget to 1 and let Max’s
budget be ν. We find two sequences {νx}x>0 and {βx}x>0, which we refer to as the budget sequence with
properties on which we elaborate below. Max’s bid depends on the position in the budget sequence as well
as the strength of the vertex. We find it more convenient to normalize the strength.
Definition 12. (Normalized strength). Let S = maxv |Str(v)|. The normalized strength of a vertex v ∈ V
is nStr(v) = Str(v)/S.
Formally, when the token is placed on a vertex v ∈ V and the position of the walk is x, then Max bids
βx · nStr(v). Note that nStr(v) ∈ [0, 1], for all v ∈ V .
We describe the intuition of the construction. We think of Max’s strategy as maintaining a position
x ∈ IR>0 on a walk, where his bidding strategy maintains the invariant that his ratio exceeds νx. For
example, in Section 4.1, the vertices have the same importance, thus their strength is 1. For k ∈ IN, we
have νk = Tk+1/(k + 1)2 and βk = 1/(k + 1)2, and whenever the position is x = k, Max’s ratio exceeds
νk. We distinguish between two cases. Suppose first that ν ≥ 1. If Max wins the bidding in v, then the
next position of the walk is x + nStr(v), and if Min wins the bidding, the next position is x − nStr(v) · ν.
When ν < 1, the next position when Max wins is x + nStr(v) · ν−1, and when he loses, the next position
is x − nStr(v). There are two complications when comparing with the proof in Section 4.1. First, while in
Section 4.1, we always take one step when winning a bidding, here the number of steps taken at a vertex
v depends on the importance of v. Unlike that proof, a step of s ∈ Q does not necessarily correspond to a
change of s in the energy. Lemma 10 guarantees that steps in the walk even out with changes in energy at
the end of cycles, which suffices for our purposes. Second, that proof addresses the case of r = 1/2 and
here we consider general ratios. When Max’s initial ratio is r, winning a bidding is r-times more costly than
winning a bidding for Min. This is illustrated in Example 2, where when Min has a budget of 2 +  and Max
has a budget of 1, Min pushes a Max winning bid of b on the queue twice.
We define the following budget sequence.
Definition 13. Let r = ν1+ν > 0 be an initial ratio. For x > 0, we define νx = ν(1+
2
x) and βx =
2·min(1,ν)
x(x+1) .
The most important property of the sequences is maintaining the invariant between x and the ratio νx.
Recall that Max’s budget exceeds νx at position x and Min’s budget is 1. Suppose Max’s bid is b. Then,
upon winning, Max’s new budget is νx − b, and upon losing and re-normalizing Min’s budget to 1, Max’s
new budget is at least νx/(1− b). The following lemma shows that the invariant is maintained in both cases.
Lemma 14. For any 0 < x, ν and n ∈ [0, 1], if x(x+ 1) > 2 · n ·min(1, ν), we have
ν(1 + 2x)
1− 2·n·min(1,ν)x(x+1)
≥ ν
(
1 +
2
x− n ·min(1, ν)
)
and ν(1+
2
x
)−2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
≥ ν
(
1 +
2
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1)
)
Proof. We start with the first claim and argue that x(x+1) > 2 ·n ·min(1, ν) implies that x > nmin(1, ν).
If x > 1, the latter follows directly from our assumptions on n (and that min(1, ν) ≤ 1). On the other hand,
if 0 < x ≤ 1, the former can be written as xc > n ·min(1, ν), for c = x+12 ≤ 1, which in particular, implies
that x > n ·min(1, ν).
We have that
ν(1 + 2x)
1− 2·n·min(1,ν)x(x+1)
= ν ·
x+2
x
x(x+1)−2·n·min(1,ν)
x(x+1)
= ν · (x+ 2)(x+ 1)
x(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
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(we have that the denominators are > 0 since x(x+ 1) > 2 · n ·min(1, ν)).
Also,
ν
(
1 +
2
x− n ·min (1, ν)
)
= ν
(
x− n ·min(1, ν) + 2
x− n ·min(1, ν)
)
.
(we have that x− n ·min (1, ν) > 0 from above).
Thus,
ν
(
1 + 2x
)
1− 2·n·min(1,ν)x(x+1)
≥ ν
(
1 +
2
x− n ·min(1, ν)
)
⇔
(x+ 2)(x+ 1)
x(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν) ≥
x− n ·min(1, ν) + 2
x− n ·min(1, ν) ⇔
(x+ 2)(x+ 1)(x− n ·min(1, ν)) ≥ (x− n ·min(1, ν) + 2)(x(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)) ⇔
(x+ 2)(x+ 1)(x− n ·min(1, ν))− (x− n ·min(1, ν) + 2)(x(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)) ≥ 0 ⇔
2nmin(1, ν)(1− nmin(1, ν)) ≥ 0
Note that n and min(1, ν) are in [0, 1] and thus, the inequality is true, because each factor is ≥ 0, and
we are done.
We proceed to the second claim and show that for any 0 < x, ν and n ∈ [0, 1], we have
ν
(
1 +
2
x
)
− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
≥ ν
(
1 +
2
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1)
)
We have that
ν
(
1 +
2
x
)
− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
= ν · x+ 2
x
− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
=
ν(x+ 2)(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
.
Also,
ν(1 +
2
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1)) = ν ·
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1) + 2
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1) .
Thus,
ν
(
1 +
2
x
)
− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
≥ ν
(
1 +
2
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1)
)
⇔
ν(x+ 2)(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν)
x(x+ 1)
≥ ν · x+ n ·min(1, ν
−1) + 2
x+ n ·min(1, ν−1) ⇔
(ν(x+ 2)(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν))(x+ n ·min(1, ν−1)) ≥ ν · x(x+ 1) · (x+ n ·min(1, ν−1) + 2) ⇔
(ν(x+ 2)(x+ 1)− 2 · n ·min(1, ν))(x+ n ·min(1, ν−1))− ν · x(x+ 1) · (x+ n ·min(1, ν−1) + 2) ≥ 0 ⇔
2nmin(1, ν)(1− nmin(1, ν−1)) ≥ 0
Note that n, min(1, ν) and min(1, ν−1) are in [0, 1] and thus, the inequality is true, because each factor
is ≥ 0.
4.4 Putting it all together
In this section we combine the ingredients developed in the previous sections to solve arbitrary strongly-
connected mean-payoff games.
14
Theorem 15. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff poorman game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1]. The
value of G with respect to r equals the value of the random-turn mean-payoff game RTr(G) in which Max
chooses the next move with probability r, thus MPr(G) = MP(RTr(G)).
Proof. We assume w.l.o.g. that MP(RTr(G)) = 0 since otherwise we decrease this value from all weights.
Also, the case where r ∈ {0, 1} is easy since RTr(G) is a graph and in G, one of the players can win all
biddings. Thus, we assume r ∈ (0, 1). Recall that MP(pi) = lim infn→∞ E(pi
n)
n . We show a Max strategy
that, when the game starts from a vertex v ∈ V and with an initial ratio of r + , guarantees that the energy
is bounded below by a constant, which implies MP(pi) ≥ 0.
Note that showing such a strategy for Max suffices to prove MPr(G) = 0 since our definition for a payoff
favors Min. Consider the game G′ that is obtained from G by multiplying all weights by −1. We associate
Min in G with Max in G′, thus an initial ratio of 1 − r −  for Min in G is associated with an initial ratio
of r +  of Max in G′. We have MP(RT1−r(G′)) = −MP(RTr(G)) = 0. Let f be a Max strategy in G′ that
guarantees a non-negative payoff. Suppose Min plays in G according to f and let pi be a play when Max
plays some strategy. Since f guarantees a non-negative payoff in G′, we have lim supn→∞E(pin)/n ≤ 0 in
G, and in particular MP(pi) = lim infn→∞E(pin)/n ≤ 0.
Before we describe Max’s strategy, we need several definitions. In Definition 13, we set νx = ν · (1 +
2/x), which clearly tends to ν from above. We can thus choose κ ∈ IN such that Max’s ratio is greater than
νκ. Suppose Max is playing according to the strategy we describe below and Min is playing according to
some strategy. The play induces a walk on {νx}x∈Q≥0 , which we refer to as the budget walk. Max’s strategy
guarantees the following:
Invariant: Whenever the budget walk reaches an x ∈ Q, then Max’s ratio is greater than νx.
The walk starts in κ and the invariant holds initially due to our choice of κ. Suppose the token is placed
on the vertex v ∈ V and the position of the walk is x. Max bids nStr(v) · βx, and he moves to v+ upon
winning. Suppose first that ν ≥ 1. If Max wins the bidding, then the next position of the walk is x+nStr(v),
and if Min wins the bidding, the next position is x− nStr(v) · ν. When ν < 1, the next position when Max
wins is x + nStr(v) · ν−1, and when he loses, the next position is x − nStr(v). Lemma 14 implies that in
both cases the invariant is maintained.
Claim: For every Min strategy, the budget walk stays on positive positions and never reaches x = 0.
Suppose ν ≥ 1. Thus, when Max loses with a bid of 2n/x(x + 1), we step down n steps. In order to
reach x = 0, the position needs to be x = n. But then, Max’s bid is 2n/n(n + 1) ≥ 1, thus Max wins the
bidding since Min’s budget is 1. Similarly, when ν < 1, when the bid is 2nν/x(x+ 1), we step down n · ν,
and we need x = n · ν to reach x = 0. Again, since 2nν/nν(nν + 1) ≥ 1, Max wins the bidding.
Claim: The strategy is legal; Max’s bids never exceed his available budget.
Indeed, we have 2nmin(1, ν)/x(x+ 1) ≤ ν(1 + 2/x), for every 0 ≤ n ≤ 1 and ν > 0 since x > 0.
Claim: The energy throughout a play is bounded from below. Formally, there exists a constant c ∈ IR such
that for every Min strategy and a finite play pi, we have E(pi) ≥ c.
Consider a finite play pi. We view pi as a sequence of vertices in G. Recall that the budget walk starts at
κ, that G(pi) and I(pi) represent sums of strength of vertices, and that S = maxv∈V |Str(v)| and nStr(v) =
Str(v)/S. Suppose the budget walk reaches x following the play pi. Then, when ν ≥ 1, we have x =
κ − G(pi)/S + I(pi)/νS. Combining with x ≥ 0, we have S · κ · ν ≤ −G(pi) · ν + I(pi). Let P =
maxu,v Potr(u) − Potr(v). Re-writing Lemma 10, we obtain −G(pi) · ν + I(pi) ≤ E(pi) + P . Combining
the two, we have E(pi) ≥ −P − S · κ · ν. Similarly, when ν < 1, we have x = κ−G(pi) · ν/S + I(pi)/S
and combining with Lemma 10, we obtain E(pi) ≥ −P − S · κ, and we are done.
Remark 16. Richman vs poorman bidding. An interesting connection between poorman and Richman
biddings arrises from Theorem 15. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G. For an initial ratio
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r ∈ [0, 1], let MPrP(G) denote the value of G with respect to r with poorman bidding. With Richman bidding
[6], the value does not depend on the initial ratio rather it only depends on the structure of G and we can
thus omit r and use MPR(G). Moreover, mean-payoff Richman-bidding games are equivalent to uniform
random-turn games, thus MPR(G) = MP(RT0.5(G)). Our results show that poorman games with initial ratio
0.5 coincide with Richman games. Indeed, we have MPR(G) = MP0.5P (G). To the best of our knowledge
such a connection between the two bidding rules has not been identified before.
Remark 17. Energy poorman games. The proof technique in Theorem 15 extends to energy poorman
games. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G, and let r ∈ [0, 1] such that MPr(G) = 0. Now,
view G as an energy poorman game. The proof of Theorem 15 shows that when Max’s initial ratio is r + ,
there exists an initial energy level from which he can win the game. On the other hand, when Max’s initial
ratio is r − , Min can win the energy game from every initial energy. Indeed, consider the game G′ that
is obtained from G by multiplying all weights by −1. Again, using Theorem 15 and associating Min with
Max, Min can keep the energy level bounded from above, which allows him, similar to the qualitative case,
to play a strategy in which he either wins or increases his ratio by a constant. Eventually, his ratio is high
enough to win arbitrarily many times in a row and drop the energy as low as required.
Remark 18. A general budget sequence. The proof of Theorem 15 uses four properties of the “budget
sequence” {νx}x≥0 and {βx}x≥0 that is defined in Definition 13: (1) the invariant between Max’s ratio and
rx is maintained (shown in Lemma 14), (2) the bids never exceed the available budget, (3) limx→∞ νx =
ν, and (4) the walk never reaches x = 0. The existence of a budget sequence with these properties is
shown in [9] for taxman bidding, which generalize both Richman and poorman bidding: taxman bidding
is parameterized with a constant τ ∈ [0, 1], where the higher bidder pays portion τ of his bid to the other
player and portion (1−τ) to the bank. Unlike that proof, we define an explicit budget sequence for poorman
bidding.
4.5 Extention to general mean-payoff games
We extend the solution in the previous sections to general graphs in a similar manner to the qualitative case;
we first reason about the BSCCs of the graph and then construct an appropriate reachability game on the
rest of the vertices. Recall that, for a vertex v in a mean-payoff game, the ratio Th(v) is a necessary and
sufficient initial ratio to guarantee a payoff of 0.
Consider a mean-payoff poorman game G = 〈V,E,w〉. Recall that, for v ∈ V , Th(v) is the necessary
and sufficient initial ratio for Max to guarantee a non-positive payoff. Let S1, . . . , Sk ⊆ V be the BSCCs
of G and S = ⋃1≤i≤k Si. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the mean-payoff poorman game Gi = 〈Si, E|Si , w|Si〉 is a
strongly-connected game. We define ri ∈ [0, 1] as follows. If there is an r ∈ [0, 1] such that MPr(Gi) = 0,
then ri = r. Otherwise, if for every r, we have MPr(Gi) > 0, then ri = 0, and if for every r, we have
MPr(Gi) < 0, then ri = 1. By Theorem 15, for every v ∈ Si, we have Th(v) = ri. We construct a
generalized reachability game G′ that corresponds to G by replacing every Si in G with a vertex ui. Player 1
wins a path in G iff it visits some ui and when it visits ui, Player 1’s ratio is at least ri. It is not hard to
generalize the proof of Theorem 7 to generalized reachability poorman games and obtain the following.
Theorem 19. The threshold ratios in a mean-payoff poorman game G coincide with the threshold ratios in
the generalized reachability game that corresponds to G.
4.6 Applying bidding games in reasoning about auctions for online advertisements
In this section we show an application of mean-payoff poorman-bidding games in reasoning about auctions
for online advertisements. A typical webpage has ad slots; e.g., in Google’s search-results page, ads typically
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appear above or beside the “actual” search results. Different slots have different value depending on their
positions; e.g., slots at the top of the page are typically seen first, thus generate more clicks and are more
valuable. A large chunk of the revenue of companies like Google comes from auctions for allocating ad
slots that they regularly hold between advertisement companies.
Consider the following auction mechanism. At each time point (e.g., each day), a slot is auctioned
and the winner places an ad in the slot. It is common practice in auctions for online ads to hold second-
price auctions; namely, the higher bidder sets the ad and pays the bid of the second-highest bidder to the
auctioneer. Suppose there are k ∈ IN ad slots. We take the view-point of an advertiser. The state of the
webpage is given by s¯ ∈ {0, 1}k, where an advertiser’s ad appears in a slot 1 ≤ i ≤ k iff si = 1. We
assume that we are given a reward function ρ : {0, 1}k → Q that assigns the utility obtained from each state
s¯ ∈ {0, 1}k; e.g., the reward can be the expected revenue, which is the expected number of clicks on his
ads times the expected revenue from each click. The utility for an infinite sequence s¯1, s¯2, . . . is the mean-
payoff of ρ(s¯1), ρ(s¯2), . . .. We are interested in finding an optimal bidding strategy in the ongoing auction
under two simplifying assumptions: (1) the utility is obtained only from the ads and does not include the
price paid for them, and (2) we assume two competitors and full information of the budgets. We obtain an
optimal bidding strategy by finding an optimal strategy for Max in a mean-payoff poorman-bidding game.
In Section 6, we discuss extensions of the bidding games that we study in this paper, that are needed to
weaken the two assumptions above.
As a simple example, the special case of one ad slot is modelled as the game in Fig. 1: in each turn the
ad slot is auctioned, Max gets a reward of 1 when his ad shows and a penalty of −1 when the competitor’s
ad is shown. We formalize the general case. Consider an ongoing auction with k slots and a reward function
ρ. We construct a mean-payoff poorman-bidding game Ak,ρ = 〈V,E,w〉 as follows. We define V =
{1, . . . , k} × {0, 1}k. Consider v = 〈`, s¯〉 ∈ V , where 1 ≤ ` ≤ k and s¯ = 〈s1, . . . , sk〉 ∈ {0, 1}k. The
vector s¯ represents the state of the webpage following the previous bidding. The slot that is auctioned at v
is `, thus the vertex v has two neighbors u1 = 〈`1, s¯1〉 and u2 = 〈`2, s¯2〉 with `1 = `2 = ` + 1 mod k.
The state of the slots apart from the `-th slot stay the same, thus for every i 6= `, we have s1i = s2i = si.
The vertex u1 represents a Max win in the bidding and u2 a Max lose, thus s1` = 1 and s
2
` = 0. Finally, the
weight of v is ρ(s¯). Note that Ak,ρ is a strongly-connected mean-payoff poorman-bidding game.
Theorem 20. Consider a second-price ongoing auction with k slots and a reward function ρ. An optimal
strategy for Max in the poorman-bidding game Ak,ρ coincides with an optimal bidding strategy in the
auction.
Proof. The only point that requires proof is that mean-payoff poorman-bidding games are equivalent to
mean-payoff games with second-price auctions. Consider a strongly-connected mean-payoff game G. Let
r ∈ (0, 1). Suppose Max’s initial budget is r + , for  > 0. Theorem 15 constructs a Max strategy f
that guarantees a payoff of at least MP(RTr(G)) under poorman bidding rules. A close look at this strategy
reveals that it ensures a payoff of at least MP(RTr(G)) under second-price rules. Indeed, let b be the Max
bid prescribed by f following a finite play. Then, if Max wins the bidding, his payment is at most b. On
the other hand, if Min wins the bidding, he pays at least b. In both cases the invariant on Max’s budget is
maintained as in the proof of Theorem 15. Finally, a dual argument as in Theorem 15 shows that Min can
guarantee a payoff of at most MP(RTr(G)) with second-price bidding rules. We thus conclude that the value
of G under second-price bidding coincides with the value under poorman bidding, and we are done.
We can use Theorem 20 to answer questions of the form “can an advertiser guarantee that his ad shows
at least half the time, in the long run?”. Indeed, set ρ(s¯) = 1 when the ad shows and ρ(s¯) = 0 when it does
not. Then, the payoff corresponds to the long-run average time that the ad shows.
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5 Computational Complexity
We study the complexity of finding the threshold ratios in poorman games. We formalize this search problem
as the following decision problem. Recall that threshold ratios in reachability poorman games may be
irrational (see Theorem 7).
THRESH-BUD Given a bidding game G, a vertex v, and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1] ∩Q, decide whether Th(v) ≥ r.
Theorem 21. For poorman parity games, THRESH-BUD is in PSPACE.
Proof. To show membership in PSPACE, we guess the optimal moves for the two players. To verify the
guess, we construct a program of the existential theory of the reals that uses the relation between the thresh-
old ratios that is described in Theorem 7. Deciding whether such a program has a solution is known to be
in PSPACE [16]. Formally, given a parity poorman game G = 〈V,E, p〉 and a vertex v ∈ V , we guess,
for each vertex u ∈ V , two neighbors u+, u− ∈ N(u). We construct the following program. For every
vertex u ∈ V , we introduce a variable xu, and we add constraints so that a satisfying assignment to xu
coincides with the threshold ratio in u. Consider a BSCC S of G. Recall that the threshold ratios in S are
all either 0 or 1, and verifying which is the case can be done in linear time. Suppose the threshold ratios are
α ∈ {0, 1}. We add constraints xu = α, for every u ∈ S. For every vertex u ∈ V that is not in a BSCC,
we have constraints xu =
xu+
1−xu−+xu+ and xu− ≤ xu′ ≤ xu+ , for every u
′ ∈ N(u). By Theorems 7 and 8,
a satisfying assignment assigns to xu the ratio Th(u). We conclude by adding a final constraint xv ≥ r.
Clearly, the program has a satisfying assignment iff Th(v) ≥ r, and we are done.
We continue to study mean-payoff games.
Theorem 22. For mean-payoff poorman games, THRESH-BUD is in PSPACE. For strongly-connected
games, it is in NP and coNP. For strongly-connected games with out-degree 2, THRESH-BUD is in P.
Proof. To show membership in PSPACE, we proceed similarly to the qualitative case, and show a nondeter-
ministic polynomial-space that uses the existential theory of the reals to verify its guess. Given a game G, we
construct a program that finds, for each BSCC S of G, the threshold ratio for all the vertices in V . We then
extend the program to propagate the threshold ratios to the rest of the vertices, similar to Theorem 19. Given
a strongly-connected game G and a ratio r ∈ [0, 1], we construct RTr(G) in linear time. Then, deciding
whether MP(RTr(G)) ≥ 0, is known to be in NP and coNP.
The more challenging case is the solution for strongly-connected games with out-degree 2. Consider
such a game G = 〈V,E,w〉 and r ∈ [0, 1]. We construct an MDP D on the structure of G such that
MP(D) = MPr(G). Since finding MP(D) is known to be in P, the claim follows. When r ≥ 12 , then D is a
max-MDP, and when r < 12 , it is a min-MDP. Assume the first case, and the second case is similar. We split
every vertex v ∈ V in three, where v ∈ VMax and v1, v2 ∈ VN . Suppose {u1, u2} = N(v). Intuitively,
moving to v1 means that Max prefers moving to u1 over u2. Thus, we have Pr[v1, u1] = r = 1−Pr[v1, u2]
and Pr[v2, u1] = 1− r = 1− Pr[v2, u2]. It is not hard to see that MP(D) = MPr(G).
6 Discussion
We studied for the first time infinite-duration poorman-bidding games. Historically, poorman bidding has
been studied less than Richman bidding, but the reason was technical difficulty, not lack of motivation. In
practice, while the canonical use of Richman bidding is a richer notion of fairness, poorman bidding, on the
other hand, are more common since they model an ongoing investment from a bounded budget. We show
the existence of threshold ratios for poorman games with qualitative objectives. For mean-payoff poorman
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games, we construct optimal strategies with respect to the initial ratio of the budgets. We show an equiva-
lence between mean-payoff poorman games and random-turn games, which, to the best of our knowledge,
is the first such equivalence for poorman bidding. Unlike Richman bidding for which an equivalence with
random-turn games holds for reachability objectives, for poorman bidding no such equivalence is known.
We thus find the equivalence we show here to be particularly surprising.
We expect the mathematical structure that we find for poorman bidding to be useful in adding to these
games concepts that are important for modelling practical settings. For example, our modelling of ongoing
auctions made two simplifying assumptions: (1) utility is only obtained from the weights in the graph,
and (2) two companies compete for ads and there is full information on the company’s budgets. Relaxing
both assumptions are an interesting direction for future work. Relaxing the second assumption requires an
addition of two orthogonal concepts that were never studied in bidding games: multiple players and partial
information regarding the budgets. Finally, the deterministic nature of bidding games is questionable for
practical applications, and a study of probabilistic behavior is initiated in [8].
To the best of our knowledge, we show the first complexity upper bounds on finding threshold ratios
in poorman games. We leave open the problem of improving the bounds we show; either improving the
PSPACE upper bounds or showing non-trivial lower bounds, e.g., showing ETR-hardness. Since threshold
ratios can be irrational, we conjecture that the problem is at least Sum-of-squares-hard. The complexity of
finding threshold ratios in un-directed reachability Richman-bidding games (a.k.a. “tug-of-war” games) was
shown to be in P in [31], thereby solving the problem for uniform undirected random-turn games. Recently,
the solution was extended to un-directed biased reachability random-turn games [40].
This work belongs to a line of works that transfer concepts and ideas between three areas with different
takes on game theory: formal methods, algorithmic game theory [38], and AI. Examples of works in the
intersection of these fields include logics for specifying multi-agent systems [3, 20, 36], studies of equilibria
in games related to synthesis and repair problems [19, 17, 25, 2], non-zero-sum games in formal verification
[21, 14], and applying concepts from formal methods to resource allocation games; e.g., network games
with rich specifications [11] and an efficient reasoning about very large games [5, 29].
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